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As the Japanese population structure changes, health care and long-term care 
costs will steadily increase. The current style of financing (pay-as-you-go) will create a 
large increase in future burden of these costs. This paper studies an alternative policy 
that prefunds the social insurance benefits for the elderly.   
During a transition process, the proposed scheme maintains a higher contribution 
rate in order to accumulate sufficient funds. Under our baseline scenario, the sum of the 
contribution rates toward health insurance and long-term care insurance increases from 
5.06 percent of earnings to 12.41 percent of the same. The rate of increase in overall 
burdens, including taxes and subsidies, is 63 percent.   
Our sensitivity analysis has shown that the quantitative implications of the 
increase in total burdens depend on social cost scenarios, the labor force, and the 
interest rate. However, labor force scenarios do not have a considerable impact on the 
rate of burden. As against this, the setting of social costs has a significant impact on the 
same.  
Even under the most optimistic scenario, the rate of increase in total burden is 34 
percent. Even though we cannot predict the exact amount of the necessary contribution 
rate that is capable enough to transfer the funded system, what we are sure of is that a 
significant increase in the contribution rate is inevitable. 
 
JEL classification numbers: H55, I10 
Keywords: social insurance; pre-funding; health insurance; long-term care; long-term 
care insurance 
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1. Introduction 
 
The 2003 annual report on the Japanese Economy and Public Finance (released 
by the Japanese Cabinet Office) stated “the sustainability of the present fiscal and social 
security systems is uncertain and hence, an early commitment toward bold institutional 
reforms is required.” The annual report listed for the first time social security reforms 
with regard to the aging population, and presented these reforms not in the form of a 
problem to be dealt with in the future but as an issue of urgent importance. 
In the public pension reforms of 2004, Japan cut future pension benefits 
substantially. Since the ratio of the aggregate pension benefits to the national income 
(NI) is designed to be stable in the future, the financial problems associated with public 
pension have been resolved to some extent. Failure to reduce intergenerational 
inequality is a persistent problem in the public pension program; this is because the 
primary aim of the reforms was to reduce the pension benefits and contributions of 
future generations.   
The expenditure incurred on health insurance and long-term care insurance is also 
expected to increase. It is not easy however to reduce these benefits as pension benefits 
because health care and long-term care services are essential for human welfare. 
Bradford and Max (1997) and Cutler and Sheiner (2000) have shown that an unfunded 
health insurance creates considerable intergenerational income redistribution. If these 
health insurance costs are financed using the current scheme (essentially, a 
pay-as-you-go system), a large increase in the future burden of these costs will become 
inevitable, thus creating an intergenerational imbalance of burden. One way of restoring 
intergenerational equity is for social insurance programs to prefund the expected 
increase in future costs. In this paper, we consider the effects of introducing a 
prefunding scheme on the intergenerational distribution of burdens. Based on the 
following three points, this paper gives new insights into the future financial problems 
of social insurance programs. 
First, this paper examines both health care and long-term care programs. Feldstein 
(1999) proposed prefunding of the Medicare program, and Suzuki (2000) conducted a 
simulation study of the prefunding of the Japanese health insurance program. This paper 
also explores the concept of prefunding long-term care insurance. Annual spending on - 2 - 
long-term care services is smaller than the expenditure incurred on health care services; 
however, long-term care costs are concentrated heavily on the aged population. 
Therefore, prefunding the cost associated with long-term care requires a large amount of 
saving. It is necessary to take into account both health and long-term care insurance in 
order to be able to comprehend the financial problems faced by social insurance 
programs in the future.   
Our analysis of the intergenerational inequity of burdens is along the lines of the 
generational accounting pioneered by Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991). Since 
we have focused on the ways in which health and long-term care costs may be financed, 
the analytical framework adopted is somewhat different from that used in the 
generational accounting approach. We specify future policy variables and calculate the 
cost burdens with regard to the specified policy scenario. Our focus is confined only to 
health and long-term care insurances, while the generational accounting model 
considers a wider range of governmental programs. We have instead provided a detailed 
discussion of these programs.   
Second, our simulation has a long time horizon until the fiscal year (FY) 2100, 
while the government has projected social security costs for health care and long-term 
care until FY 2025. Government projections with regard to social security costs were 
only until FY 2025 since the aging process was expected to reach its peak at this point 
with most baby boomers approaching the end of their lifetime. Due to a decline in 
fertility rates after the late 1970s, aging is now expected to continue beyond FY 2025; a 
much longer time horizon is required in order to examine the effects of a demographic 
change on social security costs.   
Third, the validity of future projections is examined. The main alternative 
scenario here assumes that with the exception of population structure, all the present 
factors will be sustained in the future. This projection procedure is applied mechanically 
to the labor force, health care expenditure, and long-term care costs instead of 
constructing a sophisticated forecasting model. A virtue of the mechanical projection 
model is that relationships between the variables under consideration can be easily 
established. Comparing the projected values with the government’s forecasts can clarify 
the manner in which projections are influenced by the government assumptions. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the current - 3 - 
problems in the budget of the Japanese social security programs. We point out that the 
growth of health and long-term care costs is the most serious problem for the 
sustainability of the government budget.   
Section 3 focuses on the projections of labor force participation. The government 
projection is optimistic because it assumes that a greater number of women and the 
elderly will participate in the labor market. We provide an alternative projection in 
which increasing labor force participation is not expected. Although the estimated labor 
force depends on the assumptions of labor supply behavior, the trend decline in the total 
labor force will be significant in any scenario.   
Section 4 focuses on health care expenditure and long-term care service costs. We 
project these costs until FY 2100 with regard to three scenarios. Even under the most 
optimistic scenario that assumes stagnation in the growth of per capita cost, the 
abovementioned costs to income will steadily increase until the 2060s.   
Section 5 explains some policy simulations that deal with the financing of future 
health and long-term care costs until FY 2100. It is shown that the balanced budget 
operation of health and long-term care insurances will create a large inequity of burden 
across generations. Raising the premium immediately and prefunding rising future costs 
will help to equate the burden across generations. However, with regard to our baseline 
scenario, the total burden must be raised immediately by approximately 60 percent.   
We present some concluding remarks in Section 6.   
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2. Long-term Projection of Social Security Benefits 
 
The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) occasionally publishes 
“Perspectives on the Benefits and Burdens of the Social Security System” 
(Shakai-hoshou no Kyufu to Futan no Mitooshi), which projects the benefits and 
burdens associated with public pension, health care, and social work, including 
long-term care. According to the projections made in May 2004 (we refer to it as 
MHLW 2004 projection hereafter), total social security benefits are expected to increase 
from 23.5 percent of the total NI at factor cost to 29 percent between FY 2004 and FY 
2025 (see Table 1).
1  
 
Table 1:  Projection of Social Security Benefits and Burdens
Fiscal Year
2004 2010 2015 2025
Social security benefits 23.5 25.4 27.0 29.0
  Public pension 12.6 12.8 12.9 12.2
  Health care 7.1 8.2 9.2 11.2
  Welfare, etc. 3.8 4.3 4.7 5.7
    Long-term care 1.4 2.2 2.7 3.6
Social security burdens 21.3 24.2 26.6 29.5
 Social insurance premium 14.2 15.5 16.7 18.3
 Government subsidies 7.1 8.7 9.6 11.2
Note) Numbers indicate percentages of NI at factor cost.
Source) Perspectives on the Benefits and Burdens of Social Security
System (May 2004, Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare).
 
 
However, future trends in these benefits vary with social security programs. 
Public pension benefits will not increase and will actually become slightly lower in FY 
2025 as compared to their current levels. This stabilization of future pension benefits 
                                                 
1 The ratio of total security benefits to NI at factor cost indicates an unnecessary 
fluctuation when the VAT tax rate changes. The Japanese government had begun to use 
the ratio of total security benefits to NI at factor cost long before the introduction of 
VAT. In this paper, however, we shall focus on the ratio of these benefits to GDP 
instead. - 5 - 
was achieved by the pension reform of 2004. Prior to this reform, the contribution rate 
for private employees toward the pension program was planned to increase gradually 
from 13.58 percent of total earnings to 23.1 percent of the same in FY 2020. Since this 
figure appeared to be unacceptable, controlling the contribution rate became the 
primary focus of this reform. The final contribution rate was reduced to 18.3 percent of 
total earnings, and a significant reduction in benefits for the future was implemented. 
However, this reform does not resolve all of the major problems. As explained by 
Maekawa (2004), since benefits are gradually reduced, the reform fails to correct the 
inequity in net benefits among generations. An immediate reduction in benefits 
accompanied by an increase in the contribution rate is necessary to reduce the 
intergenerational inequity.   
An emerging component of social costs is the benefits of health insurance and 
long-term care insurance. Health care benefit as a fraction of NI will increase by 4.1 
percentage points until FY 2025, whereas the long-term care benefit will grow by 2.2 
percentage points during the same period. The big question that needs to be answered 
by the policy makers is: How to finance these costs?   
If health and long-term care insurances are operated by the pay-as-you-go system, 
the cost burden on workers will steadily increase, thus creating an intergenerational 
imbalance of burdens. Prefunding future social security costs will help to reduce this 
imbalance by forcing the present generations to pay more, thereby reducing the extra 
burden on future generations. The financial condition of a prefunding system relies on 
future economic variables such as the interest rate, wage growth rate, and technological 
change in medicine. Since the reliability of a future projection is a crucial factor in 
determining the success of a prefunding schemes, we shall examine how a prefunding 
system is affected by the future conditions of the Japanese economy. 
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3. Economic Growth and the Labor Force 
 
In this section and the succeeding one, we shall discuss the properties of 
governmental projections and provide our alternative projections on the labor force, 
economic growth, health care costs, and long-term care costs. This section focuses on 
variables that determine income. 
The publication “Perspectives on the Benefits and Burdens of Social Security” 
does not rely on a general equilibrium model of the economy. It assumes the growth rate 
of real national income to be the sum of the growth rates of wage and labor force. This 
framework can be justified in the following situation. A production function is 
homogeneous of degree one with capital K and labor L. This function witnesses a 
labor-augmenting technological progress. It is represented as 
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Here, Y and A represent the output and efficiency, respectively. Differentiating (1) with 
















Y K & & & & & &






− − = .       ( 2 )  
 
When the growth rates of capital and efficiency unit of labor are the same, the 
first term in the RHS of (2) becomes zero. The economic growth rate then equals the 
sum of the growth rate of labor-augmenting technological change (the wage growth 
rate) and the growth rate of labor input. 
The MHLW 2004 projection assumes the growth rate of labor input to be 0.1 
percent until FY 2008, –0.2 percent in FY 2009 and FY 2010, and –0.5 percent from FY 
2011 onwards. The labor force in FY 2025 will be 61.58 million, which is 7.24 percent 
smaller than its level in 2004. This framework is based on a detailed projection of the 
labor force titled “A Forecast of Labor Force Participation Rates” (Rodoryokuritsu no 
Mitooshi), which was compiled by the Employment Security Bureau of MHLW in May 
2002 (We shall refer to it as the MHLW 2002 labor force projection). The lower section 
of Table 2 indicates that the MHLW 2002 labor force projection forecasts an increase in 
the labor force participation rates of the elderly and women. The upper section of Table - 7 - 
2 however, indicates the labor force calculated by multiplying the labor force 
participation rates as reported by the Employment Security Bureau and the official 
population projections (medium variant) for each age group. The calculated labor force 
in 2025 is 62.97 million, which is slightly greater than those estimated by the MHLW 
2004 projection. The initial point of the MHLW 2002 labor force projection was 2000, 
when the total labor force was 67.66 million. Due to the decline in the labor force to 
66.42 million in 2004, The MHLW 2004 projection starts with a smaller initial point 
and adopts a similar growth rate, thus estimating a smaller labor force in the future. 
 
Table 2: The Projection of the Labor Force by MHLW
Male Female
Year 2000 2025 2000 2025
Labor force 40,140 36,310 27,520 26,655
(thousands)
(percent)
15–19 18.4 20.1 16.6 17.8
20–24 72.7 77.6 72.7 73.7
25–29 95.8 95.9 69.9 75.3
30–34 97.7 97.6 57.1 65.0
35–39 97.8 97.8 61.4 67.4
40–44 97.7 97.8 69.3 75.2
45–49 97.3 97.5 71.8 77.0
50–54 96.7 96.9 68.2 73.5
55–59 94.2 94.4 58.7 67.5
60–64 72.6 85.0 39.5 60.5
65– 34.1 29.5 14.4 13.0
Labor force participation
Rates by age group
Note: The 2025 labor force is calculated by multiplying the projected population
(medium variant) reported in the Population Projections for Japan: 2001–2050
(January 2002, National Institute of Population and Social Security Research) by
the labor force participation rates by age groups.
Source: The 2025 labor force: the Perspective on the Labor Force Participation
Rate (July 2002, the Employment Security Bureau, Ministry of Health, Labor and
Welfare) and the 2000 labor force and labor force participation rate: the Labor
Force Survey (the Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and
Communications).  
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While the government projection assumes an increase in the labor force 
participation, we are apprehensive of this increase not being realized. To examine the 
impact of projecting a future labor supply optimistically, we considered an alternative 
scenario.
2 We used the labor force participation rates by age from the 2000 Population 
Census and the future population estimates from “The Population Projections for Japan: 
2001–2050” (January 2001, National Institute of Population and Social Security 
Research). The Population Census records the labor force participation rates of 
individuals up to 84 years of age (individuals aged 85 years and above are categorized 
as one age group). We rescaled the labor force participation rates of each group in such 
a manner that our estimates of the total labor force in 2000 were in concordance with 
the values reported in 2004 by the Labor Force Survey.
3  
Table 3 shows our mechanical projection. From 2004 to 2005, the labor force will 
decrease by 8 million to a level of 58.39 million people. A decrease in the labor force 
will continue after 2025 and every decade will witness a labor force loss of more than 
five million people. In 2050, a total labor force of 44.69 million people will be available. 
The rate of change in the total labor force with regard to its value in 2004 is 32.7 
percent. When a population projection is based on a low variant, the projected number 
becomes more pessimistic. In 2050, the rate of change in the total labor force with 
regard to its value in 2004 is 38 percent. Since the effects of a low birth rate appear only 
after newborn generations begin to work, the labor force in 2025 does not show 
considerable variations.   
                                                 
2 Iwamoto (1998) analyzed existing studies on labor force and also projected the labor 
force until 2020. His mechanical projection assumes that the present labor force 
participation rates by age groups will be sustained in the future and that the structure of 
future populations will change. His estimates are not very different from preceding 
estimates made in academic studies that also incorporated behavioral changes. This can 
be attributed to the fact that there is no scope for drastic changes in the labor force 
participation rates of working-age populations. In addition, although the trend regarding 
birth rates in the future is uncertain, future population can be predicted with 
considerable surety.   
3  The Population Census recorded the labor force in 2000 to be 66.1 million. According 
to the Labor Force Survey, it was 67.66 million.   - 9 - 
Table 3: Mechanical Projection of the Labor Force
（thousand person)




Year 2004 2010 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 (percent) (percent)
Medium variant (baseline)
Both sexes 66,390 64,432 60,353 58,393 56,000 50,128 44,687 -7,997 -12.0 -21,703 -32.7
Males 39,040 38,059 35,580 34,449 33,134 29,783 26,550 -4,591 -11.8 -12,490 -32.0
Females 27,350 26,373 24,774 23,945 22,866 20,345 18,138 -3,405 -12.5 -9,212 -33.7
Low variant
Both sexes 66,390 64,432 60,331 58,172 55,306 48,080 41,190 -8,218 -12.4 -25,200 -38.0
Males 39,040 38,059 35,568 34,336 32,769 28,626 24,520 -4,704 -12.1 -14,520 -37.2







Note: Author's calculation. The labor force participation rates by age group are from the 2000 Population Census, Ministry of Internal Affairs and
Communications, and the figures for future populations are from the Population Projections for Japan: 2001–2050 (January 2002, National Institute
of Population and Social Security Research). The future labor force is calculated by assuming that the labor force participation rates for 2000 will be
sustained.   - 10 - 
The MHLW 2004 projection regarded the labor force as a labor input. Since the 
efficiency of labor varies with age, the overall values of labor force and labor input may 
fluctuate differently. However, the procedure followed in the MHLW 2004 projection 
can be refined. We estimated an efficiency unit of labor implied by the two MHLW 
projections, assuming that efficiency is directly proportional to wage. The age-wage 
profile by age group and sex was collected from the published cross-tables of the 2003 
Basic Survey on Wage Structure (Chingin Kozo Kihon Chosa, MHLW). For each age 
the efficiency unit of labor input is calculated as the product of the total wage per 
worker and the projected labor force. We rescaled the aggregated efficiency unit of labor 
in 2004 so that it equalled the total labor force in that year. We considered three 
scenarios: our mechanical projection (pessimistic), the MHLW 2004 projection 
(optimistic), and the MHLW 2002 projection (more optimistic).   
Figure 1 depicts the three scenarios regarding labor input. According to our 
abovementioned normalization, the MHLW 2002 labor force projection estimated the 
labor input in 2025 to be 63.02 million. The 2004 counterpart of our mechanical 
projection is estimated to be 59.03 million. The MHLW 2004 projection underlying the 
social security cost projection lies between these two values. While the difference 
between these projections is significant, all of them project a further decline in the value 
of labor input after 2025. In 2100, the value of labor input is estimated to be 30.08 
million in the most optimistic case as against 28.08 million in the most pessimistic one. 
The bottom line is that even in the most optimistic scenario, the large decline in the 
availability of labor force will be unavoidable.   
 - 11 - 
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4. Long-term Projections of Health and Long-term Care Benefits 
 
The MHLW projection assumes that the costs incurred by health care and 
long-term care will grow more rapidly as compared to income. If our mechanical 
projection procedure is applied to both these costs, the estimates will be smaller than 
those estimated by official projections. To clarify the meaning of the official projections, 
this section describes a sensitivity analysis employing alternative settings for the key 
variables. Combining the two scenarios of health and long-term care costs with the three 
projection scenarios of labor forces, we apply six cases of projections. The following 
two subsections describe a procedure used for projecting the two costs. We then present 
the results obtained for the sensitivity analysis.   
 
4.1 Health Care Cost 
Table 4 compares five recent projections about health care and long-term care costs. 
Since projections in different years assume different inflation rates, comparing nominal 
variables is misleading. When we look at the ratios of social security benefits to NI, 
projected health expenditures differ mildly. The real growth of health care costs appears 
to be more stable than the nominal growth of the same. 
 - 13 - 
























1995 24 24 24
2000 38 26
2010 68 35 34
2025 141 107–108 96 90 71 60 59
(11–19） (11.5–18) (10–16) (10–15) (11) (11) (11)




2025 13–20 14–21 21 20 19
(2) (2.5) (3) (3.5) (3.5)
Note: Numbers represent benefits of each type of social insurance. The numbers in parenthesis represent the ratio of social insurance
benefits to NI at factor cost.
Source: Welfare Vision for the 21st Century (May 1994, Ministry of Health and Welfare) and various issues of Perspectives on the
Benefits and Burdens of the Social Security System (Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare).
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Future health expenditures are projected by extrapolating the most recent actual 
values of nominal health expenditure; these do not correspond with the values of 
inflation rate and economic growth rate. For example, the May 2004 projection assumes 
that the per capita nominal health care cost for the nonelderly (individuals under the age 
of 69) will grow at 2.1 percent and that for the elderly aged 70 and above will grow at 
3.2 percent. These growth rates are based on the historical averages recorded during 
1995 and 1999.
4 The extrapolation of nominal health expenditure without taking into 
account the effects of inflation can be problematic from the viewpoint of economic 
theory. Economists generally make projections based on real values, and the 
methodologies adopted by them belong to a family of mechanical projections. Iwamoto 
(2004) analyzed several projections made in existing studies such as Ogura and Irifune 
(1990), Ogura (1994), Niki (1995), Iwamoto, Takeshita, and Bessho (1997), Nishimura 
(1997), and Tokita et al. (1997). He concluded that in the following 30 years, the 
national health expenditure would increase by about 1.4 times compared to its level in 
2000. Our mechanical projection follows a method established by existing studies and 
assumes that per capita health expenditure by age group reported in the National 
Medical Expenditure (MHLW, shown in Table 5) will be sustained in the future. For the 
future population data, we use the medium variant of the official projection.   
Although the above projection assumes no real growth of health care cost, it can 
be easily extended to cases in which the health care cost grows. When the economy 
grows, we focus on the ratio of health care cost to income. When the health care cost 
and income grow at the same rate, the ratio will not change. In such a scenario, our 
mechanical projection estimates can be considered as this ratio. In the alternative 
framework described in the next section, we will concern ourselves only with the 
difference in growth rates between costs and income and not with the absolute levels of 
each growth rate. 
 
                                                 
4 The MHLW provides an estimation of the growth rate in medical expenditure after 
adjusting for the effects of population aging since 1980. Overall, the per capita medical 
expenditure had grown less than per capita GDP; however, this correspondence was 
reversed during the1990s. - 15 - 
Table 5: Expenditures on Health Care and Long-Term Care per
Capita by Age Group (2004 Fiscal Year)
(yen)























Note: The values are the sum of benefits from insurers and co-
payments by patients.
Health care expenditure is calculated by proportionally adjusting
the FY 2002 value reported in the National Medical Expenditure
(Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare) so that the national
aggregate matches the health care expenditure reported by
MEDIAS; this system totals the costs of services covered by
public health insurance. The National Medical Expenditure
categorizes individuals who are 75 years of age and above as one
age group.
Long-term care expenditure: the values are calculated by
multiplying the actual costs of services covered by long-term care
insurance in October 2004 as reported in the Monthly Report of
Long-term Care Benefits (Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare)
by 12. Individuals who are 40 years of age and above can be the
recipients of long-term care insurance. The Report categorizes
individuals between 40 and 60 years of age as one age group.
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Since we intend to frame our mechanical projection in such a way that it is 
comparable with the MHLW 2004 projection, the data with regard to age group were 
converted so that they were in concordance with the income level of FY 2004. First, per 
capita health care cost by age group was proportionally adjusted so that the national 
aggregate of the same matches the figures reported in the Medical Information Analysis 
System (MEDIAS), which reports the health care costs paid by public health insurance. 
The national aggregate of health care costs was calculated as the product of population 
and per capita cost by age group. The rescaled age-cost profile was used to project 
future health care costs. 
Further, we decomposed the total cost toward social insurance payment and 
out-of-pocket expenses. Unfortunately, MEDIAS does not provide this decomposition. 
We obtained the figures for social security payment from the National Medical 
Expenditure survey (Kokumin Iryohi).
5 While allocating social insurance payment 
across generations, we used the statutory coinsurance rates of 2004 and assumed that 
they will be sustained in the future. Since April 2003, the coinsurance rate for the age 
group 0–2 years has been 20 percent, whereas for the age group 3–69, it has been 30 
percent. For individuals aged 70 years and above, the rate in principle has been 10 
percent (a rate of 20 percent is applied to high-income earners). Due to the lack of 
available data, we assume that a rate of 10 percent is applied to all individuals aged 70 
and above. However, the actual out-of-pocket payments are less than the statutory 
coinsurance rate because of stop-loss rules and other schemes to reduce out-of-pocket 
expenses. We proportionally scaled the statutory coinsurance rates so that the sum of the 
estimated social insurance payments matched the aggregate values reported by 
MEDIAS in 2004. 
Since the available data on health expenditure does not separately report the 
expenditure incurred for the age groups 0–2 and 3–4, we assumed that the health 
expenditure per capita will be uniform in these age groups; we then calculated the 
                                                 
5 The National Medical Expenditure (NME) lags one year behind MEDIAS in the 
release of data. We first estimated the 2004 NME data by multiplying the growth rate of 
a comparable MEDIAS variable between 2003 and 2004 with the 2003 NME data. 
Since out-of-pocket expenses for NME also include payments of medical treatments 
that are not covered by the social security programs, we estimated the out-of-pocket 
payments as a residual of the overall payments. - 17 - 
average coinsurance rate. Since actual costs are concentrated on newborn babies, this 
procedure may slightly overestimate the true social security payment value. However, at 
the same time, many municipal governments offer extra benefits toward the health 
expenditure of infants from their general budget. Since we do not incorporate these 
subsidies into our estimation process, it results in an underestimation of the social 
security benefits granted to these age groups. However, the overall impact of these 
subsidies on our estimation bias is ambiguous. 
We then reproduced the MHLW 2004 projection of the future health insurance 
benefits. The MHLW 2004 projection assumes that the nominal wage growth rate is 2.1 
percent per annum. Therefore, per capita health care costs for the nonelderly will grow 
simultaneously with the growth rate of wage. As against this, the growth rate of per 
capita costs for the elderly will exceed that for wage by 1.1 percentage points. The 
projection with regard to the nonelderly is the same as our mechanical projection. For 
costs beyond 2025, we need to first specify the growth rate of wage for the same. If the 
growth rate of health care costs continuously exceeds that of wage, it will ultimately 
exhaust all the resources available to consumers. We thus need to assume that the 
growth in health care costs will cease sometime in the future. Hence, we consider two 
cases in which a faster growth in health care costs will eventually stop in FY 2025 or 
FY 2100. In the former case, the per capita health care cost for the elderly is 5.56 times 
greater than that for the nonelderly. The counterpart in FY2004 is 4.3. In the latter case, 
an extreme increase occurs in the growth of health care cost for the elderly; the ratio in 
FY2100 will be 13.09.   
As a measure of financial burden, we focus on the ratio of social security benefits 
to the compensation of employees and the mixed income in terms of national accounts. 
The denominator of the ratio is assumed to be proportional to the amount of labor input. 
Changes in future health care costs can be described by the following three scenarios: 
the per capita health care cost for the elderly will (1) grow at the same rate as that of 
wage growth (optimistic), (2) will exceed the wage growth rate by 1.1 percentage points 
until FY 2025 (pessimistic), or (3) will exceed the wage growth rate by 1.1 percentage 
points until FY 2100 (very pessimistic). Combining these three scenarios with future 
changes in labor input yields nine different cases of future projection. The upper section 
of Table 6 presents these ratios.   - 18 - 
 
Table 6: Projection of the ratio of Health and Long-term Care Costs to Labor Input
2010 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050 2100
Health care
social cost: optimistic
labor force: very optimistic 1.08 1.16 1.29 1.35 1.47 1.62 1.55
optimistic 1.09 1.18 1.32 1.38 1.51 1.66 1.59
pessimistic
1) 1.12 1.22 1.38 1.44 1.59 1.74 1.66
social cost: pessimistic
labor force: very optimistic 1.12 1.26 1.52 1.59 1.75 1.93 1.84
optimistic
2) 1.13 1.28 1.56 1.62 1.79 1.98 1.89
pessimistic 1.16 1.32 1.63 1.70 1.88 2.07 1.98
social cost: very pessimistic
labor force: very optimistic 1.12 1.26 1.52 1.65 1.99 2.41 3.66
optimistic 1.13 1.28 1.56 1.69 2.04 2.47 3.75
pessimistic 1.16 1.32 1.63 1.77 2.14 2.59 3.92
Long-term care
social cost: optimistic
labor force: very optimistic 1.25 1.52 2.03 2.31 2.81 3.14 3.31
optimistic 1.26 1.54 2.08 2.36 2.88 3.21 3.39
pessimistic
1) 1.29 1.59 2.17 2.47 3.02 3.37 3.55
social cost: pessimistic
labor force: very optimistic 1.34 1.73 2.61 2.97 3.61 4.03 4.25
optimistic
2) 1.35 1.76 2.67 3.03 3.70 4.13 4.35
pessimistic 1.39 1.81 2.79 3.18 3.88 4.33 4.56
social cost: very pessimistic
labor force: very optimistic 1.34 1.73 2.61 3.15 4.32 5.43 10.41
optimistic 1.35 1.76 2.67 3.22 4.42 5.56 10.65
pessimistic 1.39 1.81 2.79 3.37 4.64 5.83 11.15
Notes: Numbers represent the ratio of health care costs and long-term care costs to labor input (FY 2004 = 1).
1) Mechanical projection. The future labor force participation rate and per capita social cost by age group will
be constant.
2) A projection that replicates the MHLW 2004 projection, which is reported in Table 1.
Source: Author's calculation.  
 
The MHLW 2004 projection indicates that the ratio of health expenditure to labor 
input in FY 2025 will exceed its value in FY 2004 by 1.58. This scenario was 
reproduced in our social cost pessimistic and labor force optimistic scenarios; this 
indicates that the ratio will grow by a factor of 1.56 between FY 2004 and FY 2025. On 
the other hand, same ratio under the mechanical projection will grow by a factor of 1.38 
during the same period. Therefore, the MHLW 2004 projection is more pessimistic with 
regard to a future increase in health expenditure as compared to our mechanical 
projection. However, the most pessimistic scenario is a combination of an extremely - 19 - 
pessimistic projection of health care costs coupled with a mechanical projection of the 
labor force in the future. In this case, the ratio of health expenditure to labor input in FY 
2025 will exceed its value in FY 2004 by 1.63.   
A noticeable point is that this ratio will keep increasing, and its value in 2050 
under the setting employed by the governmental projection will be 1.98 times greater 
than its value in FY 2004. In other words, FY 2025 cannot be regarded as the terminal 
point for examining the sustainability of the health insurance system.
6 
 
4.2 Long-term care costs 
The government anticipates that long-term care costs will grow more rapidly as 
compared to health care costs. According to the MHLW 2004 projection given in Table 
4, the long-term care insurance benefits in FY 2025 (the ratio of long-term care benefits 
to NI) will be 2.7 times greater than its value in FY 2004. The growth rate of per capita 
long-term care costs is set to be higher than the wage growth rate although detailed 
assumptions have not been explicitly documented.   
Municipal governments prepare three-year business plans for long-term care 
insurance. Prior to the first revision that was made in FY 2003, The Projection of 
Demand for Long-term Care (Kaigo Sahbisuryou tou no Mitooshi, June 2002) was 
provided by the MHLW; it expected an increased demand for long-term care in the 
following five years. For example, the provisional nationwide sum of the usage of 
home-visit services will increase by 39.3 percent from FY 2003 (142,194 visits) to FY 
                                                 
6 We should note that our projections may be biased in an upward direction because 
they do not take into account the effects of aging on terminal care expenses. In Japan, 
Ohkusa (2002) and Suzuki and Suzuki (2003) provided a modified projection that took 
into account this aspect. Since terminal care expenses for the more aged tend to 
decrease, a longer longevity will increase the average age of death; hence, future health 
expenditure by age group is expected to be lower than its present level. Taking this 
effect into consideration, the abovementioned studies pointed out that the MHLW 2004 
projection overestimated the future health expenditure. Suzuki and Suzuki (2003) 
reported this overestimation amounted to approximately 4.4 percent of the total health 
expenditures for the elderly. On the other hand, Ohkusa (2002) concluded that the 
overestimation reached a level of approximately 15 to 30 percent of the total health 
expenditures. The divergence in their estimates is quite large because data limitations 
made it difficult to separate the medical expenditures of the survivors from the medical 
expenses incurred by those who died. - 20 - 
2007 (198,033 visits).
7 The projection however, did not provide the total amount of 
long-term care costs. We calculated the sum of these provisions weighted by their actual 
costs in FY 2003 and the resulting growth during FY 2003–2007 that amounted to 26.4 
percent. 
We projected the future long-term care insurance benefits by adopting a 
methodology similar to that used for the projections of health insurance.
8  At the time of 
writing this paper, most recent data for annual spending by age group was available for 
FY 2002; hence, we estimated annual spending on the basis of monthly data. The 
long-term care expenditure by age group in October 2004 was calculated from the 
Monthly Report of Long-term Care Benefits Survey (Kaigo Kyufuhi Jittai Chosa Geppo) 
conducted by the MHLW.
9 We then calculated annual spending by multiplying the 
monthly data with 12 and reported it in the right column of Table 5. The future 
long-term care expenditure was then projected under the following three settings. The 
first one (optimistic) assumed that the age-expenditure profile would not change and 
that only the population structure would change. We then decomposed the total 
spending into social security benefits and out-of-pocket expenses by assuming that the 
ratio of out-of-pocket payments to total costs in FY 2002 (8.99 percent
10) would be 
sustained.  
We then analyzed the following three scenarios of long-term care costs: (1) the 
per capita cost of each age group will grow at the wage growth rate (optimistic); (2) 
until 2025, the rate of growth in per capita cost will exceed the wage growth rate by 1.2 
percentage points and as a result, the total cost per income well approximated the 
MHLW 2004 projection (pessimistic); and (3) until 2100, the per capita cost will grow 
                                                 
7  This projection presumed that the number of individuals certified as requiring care in 
FY 2003 was 3,279,000; however, the actual number of these certified individuals was 
2,983,000 at the end of FY 2003. 
8 Mitchell, Pigott, and Shimizutani (2004), Shimizutani and Noguchi (2004), and 
Suzuki (2002) are involved in projecting the future long-term care costs. 
9  The data source does not directly report cost by age group. The available cross tables 
indicate (1) the cost by the severity of disability and (2) the total number of 
beneficiaries by the severity of disability and age group. Assuming that the long-term 
care cost of each level of disability was the same across all age groups that were 
considered, we estimated the total cost by age group by using these two cross tables. 
10 It is slightly lower than the statutory coinsurance rate (10 percent) because there are 
some measures that lighten the burden of out-of-pocket payments. 
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at a rate that exceeds the wage growth rate by 1.2 percentage points (very pessimistic). 
The properties of these settings parallel those applied for health care costs. Combining 
these settings with three labor force projections yields nine scenarios. The resulting 
ratios are presented in the lower section of Table 6. 
The rate of growth from FY 2004 to FY 2025 is projected to lie between 2.03 and 
2.79. According to the governmental projection, it is estimated to be 2.67, which is 
relatively pessimistic. If the per capita long-term care cost grows at the existing wage 
growth rate, the rate of growth is estimated to range between 2.03 and 2.17 depending 
on the labor force scenario.   - 22 - 
5. Simulation of Health Care and Long-term Care Insurance Policies 
 
5.1 Procedures of the simulation 
This section deals with the simulation of policies that finance future health and 
long-term care insurance benefits, the projections of which were described in the 
previous section. This section focuses on the effect of these policies on fiscal balances 
and burdens across generations.   
Since we regard the benefits derived from these insurances as necessary services 
when a person becomes sick or disabled, it is not very meaningful to discuss the 
intergenerational distribution of these benefits. Hence, our simulation focuses only on 
the financing of these benefits.   
From October 2007, half of the benefits derived from the health insurance of 
those aged 75 and above will be financed with government subsidies that are in turn 
financed by general tax revenues. Until October 2002, only 30 percent of these benefits 
for those aged 70 and above were financed with government subsidies. From 2002 to 
2007, a transition process gradually raised the eligible age and the share of government 
subsidies. Half of the long-term care insurance benefit is financed with government 
subsidies. The other major subsidies granted by the government are 50 percent of the 
benefits of National Health Insurance schemes (Kokuho) and 13 percent of the 
Government-managed Health Insurance for Employees (Seikan Kenpo).  
We assume that social insurance premiums and taxes for social insurance benefits 
are paid from the same income base, which is the compensation of employees and the 
mixed income in terms of national accounts. For simplicity, we further assume that 
these incomes will grow at the same rate as GDP (and labor input) after FY 2004 and 
that there are no administrative costs involved in the implementation of such social 
insurance programs.
11  
The initial and terminal years of the simulation process are set as FY 2004 and FY 
2100, respectively, because the population projection carried out by the National 
Institute of Population and Social Security Research is available only within these 
                                                 
11   For instance, the administrative cost involved with the implementation of 
Society-Managed Health Insurance for Employees is about 0.4 percent of the total 
benefits derived from such programs during FY 2001. - 23 - 
periods.  
We consider the following two policies 
 
Policy A: A balanced budget operation in which the benefits during each year are 
financed by the taxes and insurance premiums of the corresponding year 
Policy B: An attempt to reduce the intergenerational inequity of burdens by 
prefunding future social insurance payments for the elderly (details will be described in 
Section 5.3) 
 
5.2 Balanced budget 
We define burden rate as the ratio of burdens (the sum of insurance premiums and 
government subsidies financed by taxes) to 90 percent of the sum of compensation of 
employees and the mixed income. We aimed to calibrate the statutory premium rate by 
rescaling the sum of the compensation received by the employees and the mixed income. 
The health insurance premium (including government subsidies for the nonelderly and 
excluding those reserved for the elderly) for the initial year, i.e., FY 2004, is calculated 
to be 8.21 percent. The actual health insurance premium for the enrollees of the 
Government-Managed Health Insurance for Employees is calculated to be 8.2 percent. 
Since the enrollees of the Government-managed Health Insurance for Employees are 
employed with small companies, their average salary is lower than that of all the 
workers. Since government subsidies aim to offset the earnings difference, we tried to 
calibrate the statutory insurance premium. With regard to long-term care insurance, the 
simulated premium rate for FY 2004 is 1.11 percent; this matches the actual insurance 
premium paid by the enrollees of the Government-managed Health Insurance for 
Employees. Under the balanced budget, the burden is equal to social insurance benefits 
(excluding out-of-pocket payment). Therefore, we calculated the ratio of benefits to 
incomes.  
Figure 2 presents the burden rates associated with health care, long-term care, and 
a total of both of them when Policy A is implemented under the governmental 
projection (social cost-pessimistic and labor force-optimistic). The burden rate for 
health care continues to increase until FY 2059 when it touches 19.94 percent. As 
against this, the burden rate for long-term care will touch 10.97 percent in FY 2066. - 24 - 
Although the paths followed by these two burden rates appear to be parallel to each 
other in Figure 2, we must however, note that the absolute level of long-term care costs 
is low. The burden rate for long-term care grows much more rapidly than that for health 
care because compared to health care benefits, long-term care benefits are concentrated 
to a greater extent on the aged population. For the same reason, a peak representing the 
burden rate for long-term care will follow a peak of the burden rate for health care. The 
total burden rate of both the insurances reaches a peak that is 30.65 percent in FY 2064. 
The ratio of total burden to GDP then amounts to 15.63 percent in the same year. 
Figure 3 presents the lifetime burden rate of each generation under the 
governmental projection. It is defined as the ratio of lifetime burden to lifetime income. 
The lifetime variable is the sum of the present discounted values of the reported annual 
numbers during the period between the initial and the terminal points of the simulation 
process. Therefore, the burden rate is the prospective lifetime burden for the generation 
born in 2001 or earlier. To estimate lifetime income, we adopted the age-wage profile, 
which was used to calculate the labor input in Section 3. The interest rate is assumed to 
be 1 percentage point higher than the wage growth rate. 
The horizontal axis of Figure 3 represents the birth year of each generation. The 
curve representing the lifetime burden rates are not smooth for early generations, 
possibly because our prospective calculation covers only a short period for these 
generations. Figure 3 indicates that a balanced budget system will impose heavier 
burdens on the younger generations. The inequality of burdens is particularly severe for 
the current working-age generation. The lifetime burden rate for those who were born in 
2001 is estimated to be 26.2 percent while the same for those born in 1945 is 14.8 
percent. - 25 - 
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5.3 Equalizing the burden by prefunding policies 
The increasing burden on future generations, as depicted in Figure 3, may be 
circumvented by implementing a policy that levies a constant burden rate over time. 
Such a policy aims at charging a high burden rate in advance so that sufficient funds can 
be accumulated in order to prepare for increasing costs in the future. Feldstein (1999) 
advocated the idea of prefunding Medicare, which is the US public health insurance for 
the elderly.   
As an example of the prefunding of health and long-term care costs, we consider 
the following policy. With regard to health insurance, a portion of the prefunding would 
be channelized in order to finance the insurance payments dealing with health care costs 
with regard to the elderly (age 65 and over). Workers who are aged 15 and above make 
payments in the form of premiums. The health care costs for those aged 64 and below 
and government subsidies in the form of benefits to the elderly are financed by a 
pay-as-you-go system. Long-term care insurance employs a prefunding scheme, while 
government subsidies are financed by a pay-as-you-go system. Since the enrollees of 
the current system are those who are aged 40 and above, we assume that workers falling 
into this age group pay these premiums.   
The setting of the interest rate is a key factor in determining the performance of a 
prefunding scheme. When we focus on the proportion of burdens to income, it is not the 
absolute levels but the difference between the interest rate and the wage growth rate that 
matters. The MHLW projection on public pension finance in May 2004 assumed that 
the nominal interest rate would be 3.2 percent and that the growth rate of nominal wage 
would be 2.1 percent. Our baseline case sets a 1 percentage point difference between the 
interest rate and the growth rate of wage. As an alternative scenario, the difference is set 
either as 0 percent or 2 percent.
12 
                                                 
12 Feldstein and Samwick’s (1997) simulation of the prefunding of the US social 
security program assumed that the real rate of return is 9 percent, which is considerably 
higher as compared to ours. Their following researches (Feldstein and Samwick, 1998) 
used 5.5 percent as the rate of return, which is still higher as compared to ours. We 
employed lower interest rates due to the following reasons. Firstly, their rates of return 
are based on risky capital; however, we considered the risk-free rate of return. We think 
that the investment strategies pertaining to funded health care and long-term care 
insurance should be conservative because these insurances aim to finance a strictly 
targeted consumption item that cannot be easily substituted. Secondly, our simulation - 28 - 
Since the current health and long-term care insurance program is set within a 
pay-as-you-go framework, a transition to a funded system should be designed. With 
regard to health care costs, we first calculate the contribution rate that is sufficient for 
the entire cohort born in FY 2001 to finance the expected value of their lifetime health 
insurance benefits beyond the age of 65 years. This rate is estimated to be 4.96 percent 
under the governmental projection and the baseline scenario of the interest rate. If the 
cohorts born after FY 2001 pay the premium at this rate, the total accumulated funds in 
FY 2100 would amount to 111.11 percent of the GDP. Hence, the transition process is 
designed in such a manner that it accumulates this level of funds with a constant 
premium rate until FY 2100. Since the current generations did not prefund their health 
care costs, 4.96 percent of the premium rate is not sufficient to meet the target in FY 
2100. It is therefore concluded that a contribution rate of 8.52 percent will successfully 
accumulate the required funds. 
The evolution of the funded system will be achieved in the following manner 
(Table 7 summarizes the numbers that represent the burdens under Policies A and B). 
When health care costs (excluding government subsidies) are financed by a 
pay-as-you-go scheme in FY 2004, the contribution rate with regard to the same for 
individuals aged 64 and below is 4.32 percent and for those aged 65 and above is 3.89 
percent. When a transition toward a prefunding scheme begins in FY 2005, the 
contribution rate for the elderly increases to 8.52 percent under the governmental 
projection and maintains this value until FY 2100. Beyond FY 2100, the contribution 
rate for the elderly will shrink to 4.96 percent. As against this, the contribution rate for 
the health care costs of the aged below 64 is almost stable. It ranges between 3.97 
percent and 4.3 percent.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
process does not incorporate the general equilibrium effect, in which an accumulated 
social insurance fund tends to lower the interest rate of a large open economy. We 
therefore, attempt to infer the consequences of this effect by looking at a particular case 
where the interest rate is maintained at a low level from the beginning. Thirdly, given 
the recent poor performance of Japanese asset prices, a high rate of return does not 
appear plausible. - 29 - 
Table 7: Contribution Rates under the Balanced Budget and Prefunding Schemes
(A) (B)
Balanced budget Prefunding
2004 2005–2100 2005–2100 2101–
Total 12.01 12.28–28.12 19.62–26.70
Health insurance
 Nonelderly 4.32 3.97–4.30
 Elderly 3.89 3.98–9.08 8.52 4.96
 Government subsidies 2.69 2.84–10.07
Long-term care insurance 1.11 1.16–4.83 3.95 2.17
Note) Numbers represent the percentage of earnings (90 percent of compensation
of employees and mixed income). The interest rate is based on the baseline case,
and other parameters are based on the governmental projection.  
 
The transition process of the long-term care insurance program is designed along 
lines parallel to the health insurance program. The contribution rate that is sufficient for 
the cohort born in FY 2001 to finance the expected value of their lifetime long-term care 
insurance benefits is 2.17 percent under the governmental projection. If the cohorts born 
after FY 2001 pay the premium at this rate, the total accumulated funds in FY 2100 
would amount to 68.35 percent of the GDP. This amount of funds will be accumulated 
by a contribution rate of 3.95 percent during the transition process. When long-term 
care costs (excluding government subsidies) are financed by a pay-as-you-go scheme in 
FY 2004, the contribution rate is estimated to be 1.11 percent. When a transition toward 
a prefunding scheme begins in FY 2005, the contribution rate increases to 3.95 percent, 
and maintains this value until FY 2100. Beyond FY 2100, the contribution rate will 
shrink to 2.17 percent. 
For the calibrated value in FY 2004, the health insurance payments for the 
nonelderly is estimated to be 4.32 percent of the total earnings and those for the elderly 
is estimated to be 3.89 percent of the total earnings, with the long-term care costs being 
estimated as 1.11 percent. When social insurance premiums and government subsidies 
are combined, the overall burden rate becomes 12.01 percent. Under the pay-as-you-go 
system, the social costs for the elderly will grow steadily. The total burden ratio will go 
up to 28.12 percent of the total earnings. The burden rate of health insurance payments - 30 - 
will go up to 9.08 percent. The growth of government subsidies however, is more rapid, 
the highest level attained by it being 10.07 percent. 
Under the prefunding scheme, it is estimated that the burden rate will increase 
from 12.01 percent in FY 2004 to 19.62 percent in FY 2005. The rate of change in total 
burdens at the initial point is 63 percent. Since government subsidies are bound to grow, 
as in the case of the pay-as-you-go system, the highest level attained by the total burden 
rate will be 26.70 percent in FY 2064.   
Figure 4 compares the lifetime burden rates between the balanced budget and the 
prefunding schemes. We should note that the burden rates for those born after 2001 do 
not cover their whole lifetime because the simulation terminates in FY 2100. When the 
system is changed from a balanced budget to a prefunding one, generations who are 
born prior to 1997 will face a higher lifetime burden, and younger generations will 
benefit from a lower lifetime burden. The curve representing lifetime burden in Figure 4 
becomes flatter. Hence, a prefunding scheme helps to reduce the inequality of burdens. 
This will be made possible only if the current generation agrees to share burdens with 
future generations. 
Suzuki (2000) conducted a similar study dealing with the calculation of the 
transition to a fully-funded health insurance system. While our calculation unites the 
whole sector of health insurance, his calculation was based on the decomposition of the 
same into subsidiary systems of insurance. The transition was assumed to begin in FY 
1995 and attain the state of a fully-funded scheme by FY 2100. With regard to the 
Society-managed Health Insurance for Employees (Kumiai Kenpo), the contribution 
rate is estimated to increase from 7.8 percent to 9.8 percent.   
According to Suziki’s specification, a fully-funded scheme finances an 
individual’s lifetime health care costs. Before individuals begin to work, their 
pre-funding account has to borrow money. This account needs to borrow money during 
the early stages of an individual’s life. The resulting number of aggregate funds would 
still be lower than the number involved in our scheme. This is primarily the reason why 
we reported a much larger hike in the contribution rate during the transition process as 
compared to that reported in Suzuki (2000). - 31 - 
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5.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
Table 8 represents the contribution rates of the prefunding scheme in FY 
2005–2100 and beyond FY 2100 under 27 diverse scenarios. The assumption of a labor 
force participation does not affect the contribution rate to a large extent. The difference 
in the health insurance contribution rate between a pessimistic scenario and the most 
optimistic scenario is 0.36 to 0.92 percentage points. The gap between the two is large, 
when the projection of social costs is pessimistic. This reflects the fact that a funding 
scheme is not influenced by a demographic change. On the other hand, the interest rate 
affects the contribution rate. Under the optimistic scenario (in which the interest rate is 
2 percentage points higher than the wage growth rate), the contribution rate is 1.5 to 
4.68 percentage points lower than that under the pessimistic scenario. The setting of 
social costs has an even larger impact on the contribution rate, as compared to the 
impact of interest rate on the same. The difference in the contribution rates during a 
transition period between a pessimistic scenario and an optimistic scenario is 3.13 to 
6.33 percentage points. 
The above findings can also be applied to the case of long-term care insurance. 
The effect of interest rate is relatively large as compared to the size of the benefits. The 
difference in the contribution rate between the optimistic and the pessimistic scenario 
ranges between 1.08 to 3.41 percentage points.   
Even under the most optimistic scenario, the burden rate associated with health 
care and long-term care costs increases at a rate of 16.05 percentage points from the 
starting point. The rate of change in the total value of the burden rate is 34 percent, 
which is smaller than the governmental projection, but is still quite significant. Under 
the most pessimistic scenario, the rate of change is 85 percent. Although quantitative 
implications depend on the individual settings associated with each of the programs, a 
significant increase in the contribution rate is needed to implement a prefunding 
scheme. - 33 - 
Table 8: Sensitivity Analysis of Contribution Rates in a Prefunding Social Insurance Scheme
(Percent)
Health care for the elderly Long-term care
2005–2100 2101– 2005–2100 2101–
interest rate–growth rate = 2 percent
social cost: optimistic
labor force: very optimistic 6.25 2.74 2.66 1.08
optimistic 6.36 2.81 2.71 1.10
pessimistic 6.61 2.90 2.82 1.14
social cost: pessimistic
labor force: very optimistic 7.56 3.45 3.31 1.38
optimistic 7.69 3.53 3.37 1.41
pessimistic 7.99 3.64 3.51 1.46
social cost: very pessimistic
labor force: very optimistic 9.38 6.06 4.47 2.81
optimistic 9.55 6.20 4.55 2.88
pessimistic 9.92 6.40 4.73 2.97
interest rate–growth rate = 1 percent
social cost: optimistic
labor force: very optimistic 6.84 3.85 3.08 1.65
optimistic 6.97 3.94 3.14 1.69
pessimistic 7.26 4.08 3.27 1.75
social cost: pessimistic
labor force: very optimistic 8.36 4.84 3.88 2.12
optimistic 8.52 4.96 3.95 2.17
pessimistic 8.88 5.14 4.12 2.25
social cost: very pessimistic
labor force: very optimistic 11.09 8.58 5.69 4.35
optimistic 11.30 8.78 5.80 4.46
pessimistic 11.78 9.10 6.04 4.62
interest rate = growth rate
social cost: optimistic
labor force: very optimistic 7.75 5.36 3.74 2.51
optimistic 7.91 5.48 3.81 2.57
pessimistic 8.27 5.72 3.99 2.68
social cost: pessimistic
labor force: very optimistic 9.58 6.75 4.74 3.23
optimistic 9.77 6.90 4.84 3.31
pessimistic 10.22 7.19 5.06 3.44
social cost: very pessimistic
labor force: very optimistic 13.68 12.05 7.62 6.71
optimistic 13.96 12.33 7.78 6.86
pessimistic 14.60 12.84 8.14 7.15
Note) Numbers represent the percentage of earnings (90 percent of compensation of
employees and mixed income). In FY2004, the contribution rate of health insurance for
the elderly is 3.89 percent and that for long-term care insurance is 1.11 percent.
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Figure 5 maps the total number of burden rates that are associated with the 
baseline scenario and six alternative scenarios which in turn take an alternative scenario 
with one variable among the three availables. Since the baseline scenario takes into 
account an intermediate assumption regarding the three variables, it takes the 
centermost line of all the seven lines. The line at the highest level represents the case of 
the most pessimistic social cost scenario. Since the growth of social costs is assumed to 
continue till the end of this century, the burden rate for future generations is far larger in 
this scenario as compared to that in other scenarios. The lowest line represents the case 
of the most optimistic social cost scenario. Social costs have the most significant impact 
on the burden rate. The impact of labor force on the burden rate is the least among the 
three variables considered so far. Higher interest rates can reduce the burden rates 
considerably. For the generation born in 2001, the lifetime burden rate is estimated to be 
25.62 percent under the baseline scenario and 20.15 percent under the scenario with an 
interest rate higher by 1 percentage point. - 35 - 
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6. Conclusion 
 
As the Japanese population structure changes, the current approach of financing 
(pay-as-you-go) the social costs will create a large increase in the magnitude of future 
burdens. It will also create an intergenerational inequity of burdens. We analyzed an 
alternative policy that prefunds the benefits for the elderly aged 65 and above. 
Prefunding is not very popular in Japan. Our analysis aims at providing real life 
scenarios with regard to this policy option and to stimulate policy discussions. 
During the transition process until FY 2100, the scheme maintains a higher 
contribution rate in order to accumulate sufficient funds. With respect to the parameters 
implied by the governmental projection, the sum of the contribution rates with regard to 
health insurance and long-term care insurance increases from 5.00 percent of the total 
earnings to 12.47 percent of the same. The rate of increase in total burdens including 
taxes for subsidies is 63 percent.   
Our sensitivity analysis has indicated that quantitative implications depend on the 
settings of the social costs, the labor force, and the interest rate. However, labor force 
scenarios do not have a considerable impact on the rate of burden. As against this, the 
setting of social costs has a significant impact. Although we cannot predict the exact 
amount of the necessary contribution rate that would be sufficient to transfer the funded 
system, it is certain that a significant increase in the contribution rate is inevitable. Even 
under the most optimistic scenario of the 27 possible scenarios, a necessary increase in 
the contribution rates of the two social insurances is 3.91 percentage points. The rate of 
increase in the total amount of burdens is 34 percent.   
Implementing a prefunding social cost program may be a challenge because the 
initial increase in burdens is politically unfavorable. However, the cost of not 
introducing this scheme implies a heavier burden on future generations. Raising the 
contribution rate in an aggressive manner will help to reduce the intergenerational 
imbalance of burdens. 
 - 37 - 
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